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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RCTH ,V. SHUPE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ROY A. :MENLOVE, d/b/a MENLOVE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

No.
10405

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a civil action involving a claim by a contractor against an owner under a cost plus contract
and Title 38, Chapter 1 of the Utah Code.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court determined that the contractor,
Roy A. Menlove, d/b/ a Menlove Construction Com-

1

pany, and the owner of the land, Ruth W. Shupe, had
entered into a written agreement whereby )ienlove
was to construct a house upon the owner's lot and
would be compensated on the basis of cost plus 10%.
The trial court rejected the owner's contentions (ai
that there was an oral understanding with respect to
a maximum cost, and (b) that the contractor should
be compensated only on a quantum meruit basis. The
trial court held that Menlove Construction Company
had substantially performed the promises and obligations contained in the contract between the parties.
However, the trial court refused to enter judgment for
the total amount of the undisputed costs incurred by
Menlove Construction Company plus IO% thereof.
and ref used to allow the contractor a new trial for the
sole purpose of determining damages, and refused to
allow the contractor an attorney's fee or costs pursuant
to the provisions of Section 38-1-18, U.C.A.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The contractor seeks a judgment and decree in this
court awarding to him (a) judgment against the owner
and a lien against the owner's property in the swn of
$30,910.45 (which represents the actual costs of construction plus 10%, less the amounts paid by the owner) ;
(b) judgment on the defendant's Second Cause ~f
Action in Counterclaim; (c) a reasonable attorney ·1
fee and defendant's costs and disbursements, and (d)
adjudicating that the defendant is entitled to receire
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a judgment in the amount of the defendant's actual
~osts of construction plus 10% thereof. Alternatively,
the appeal seeks a new trial solely on the issue of damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant is a licensed general contractor
with 30 years' experience in the construction of residential property in the Wasatch front area (226). The
Respondent is the owner of a lot in Salt Lake City
located at 1208 Yale Avenue. Respondent's husband,
who conducted the negotiations and acted for Respondent in all relevant negotiations and transactions incident
to the construction of the house, is a civil engineer
with 40 years' experience in the construction field
(160, 161, 174). Mr. Menlove and the Shupes had
known each other for many years in a social capacity
pnor to the transaction which is the subject of the
instant litigation.
Following preliminary discussions concerning the
location of the house and the general type of construction that was involved, the parties executed an agreement, received in evidence as Exhibit I, under the terms
of which Menlove Construction Company agreed to act
as general contractor in the construction of a home on
the basis of being compensated for its cost plus 10%.

p The
. construction commenced almost immediately.

arhally constructed foundations from one or more
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houses which had been commenced on the lot were
removed during November, 1962, and the construction
proceeded through December and into the early month~
of 1963. Iiwoices were rendered during the first fe,,1
months of construction as follows:
December l, 1962 (Nov. costs)
January, 1963 (Dec. costs)
February, 1963 (Jan. costs)
:March, 1963 (Feb. costs)

$2,681.07
5,249.5-i
3,976.49
3,656.21

.Ex.

j

Ex. 6
Ex. 6
Ex. 7

The Shupe::, issued checks in payment of these imoices.
While payment of the last invoice was approximately
20 or 30 days late ( 180, 182), no objection was made
by the owners of the premises to any of the items con·
tained in the invoices or to the manner of billing or
to the amount of the bills, except that a slight adjust·
ment was made in the hourly rate of .l\lax Menlove after
the first billing (Ex. 5, p. 2) . 'Vork continued through
:March and April, 1963, and in the early part of ~lay,
the contractor sent or delivered to the owner a state·
ment, received in evidence as Exhibit 8, reflecting an
amount due at that time of $10,308.64. It appeared
from this invoice that the total costs of construction
to the end of April were $25,869.75 (Ex. 8, p. 1). The
record is uncontradicted that at this time Mr. Shupe
requested that Mr. Menlove prepare an estimate with
respect to the total estimated costs of constructwn.
Max Menlove, superintendent of construction, at the
direction of Appellant, prepared an analysis of the
cost balance of the house, and on or about June H.
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19fi.J<, at a conference attended by the Appellant,
}Iax ){enlove and l\Ir. Shupe, the figures were rene,,,·ed iu detail. A copy of this informal cost projection
was received in evidence as Exhibit 64 and the followi I;,( langmige appears at the end of the exhibit in Mr.
Shupe·s handwritnig: "Sat in conference with Roy
a11 d JUax at office June 14, 1964." It was apparent at
tbt time that the total cost of construction would be
~+9.630.00 The costs which were estimated but not
mcurred at that time appear on Exhibit 64.

The exhibit indicates that wiring, heating, plumbings, cabinets. linoleum, painting, roofing, windows
and doors. tile and finishing had not been completed
at that time. The cost of these items with the cost of
the car port, fence and finishing the plaster work were
estimated in detail. The total appearing in the exhibit
for these items was $12,933.
The projection then credits the Shupes with $2,400.00 paid earlier to Barnes Electric and adds an
estimated amount for a circular stairway for $500.00,
for 't balance of $ll,033.00; $1,000.00 is added for the
contractor's IO%, bringing the total to $47,130.00,
including the previous billings and the amount prenously paid to Barnes Electric.
Not only did Mr. and Mrs. Shupe instruct Mr.
Menlove to proceed to complete the construction as
~oon as possible, but even after they received this proJection, the record show~ that they continued to order
materials and give instructions to the men with respect
5

to various phases of construction and landscapin
(840, 845).

g.

Nor did the Shupes make any effort to reduce
costs. The door locks they selected, for example, cost
$54.10, while the 'Veiser locks used in the ordinarr
house would cost $3.85 ( 842) . All of the hard war~
was extremely expensive (ibid), and of course, the
hardware is one of the last things to install in a house.
Prior to the execution of the contract with de·
fendant, J\ilr. Shupe had considered acting as his own
general contractor ( 162, 173). The testimony is un·
disputed that as various bids were obtained from sub·
contractors incident to the various phases of construe·
tion, conferences were held with Mr. Shupe with respect
to such bids ( 292). Mr. Shupe visited the premises
nearly every day during construction from beginning
to end (292). He gave repeated and detailed sugges·
tions to Max Menlove and the employees concerning
the manner in which the work should be done (292)
The record is clear that Mr. and Mrs. Shupe approved
each subcontract for each phase of construction and
actually selected all of the items of any consequence
that went into the house. Mr. Shupe designed and
supervised the installation of an extensive network of
pipes constituting an underground drainage syste~i
.
fl
under the basement wall and around the entire pe ·
meter of the outer walls (Ex. 4) . The Shupes selected
Norman brick, knowing that it was substantially more
expensive than that ordinarily used (371). They
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selected a special mortar for the brick walls ( 191).
Mr. Shupe was present when the concrete was being
poured and was aware of the fact that a portion of
the house on the lot required the use of a crane and
a resultant fee for overtime for the operator of the
cement truck ( 295, 296). The arrangement for compensating Ron Clark, the roofer, was based upon $15
a square. The arrangement with the roof er was explained to lVIr. Shupe before roofing commenced ( 197,
293). l\Ir. Shupe was advised that the painter was to
be compensated on a time basis ( 248, 249). The Shupes
participated in the discussions with respect to the kinds
of finish to be used on the exterior of the premises and
the colors on the interior. The paint schedule was, in
fact, prepared by .Mr. Shupe after conferences between
the architect, George Cannon Young, the Shupe's decorator, Marion Cornwall, and the painter ( 47 4-476).
As a result of changes made by Mr. Shupe in the decorations of the front entry, mahogany strips were nailed
anrl removed from the front entry three different times
(297. 298). The Shupes ordered double laminated
plasterboard, the most expensive available, for the interior walls ( 204) . Through Barnes Electric, they
personally selected three furnaces to be used in the
premises ( 189, 198). They personally selected the
cabinets from Amherst Cabinet and Mill in Murray
(187, 188). They picked out the lighting fixtures, the
type of windows and doors they desired, the tile, the
linoleum and other floor covering ( 221), the plumbing
fixtures ( 224) . There was extra cost in the intricate
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steel work in the foundation ( 368), steel mesh in the
basement floor ( 371), the bearing walls were constructed from 2 x 6 lumber rather than 2 x 4. The floor
joists were 2 x 12 rather than 2 x 10. There were
double joists on both floor and ceiling (370). T!it
Shupes admitted that they selected and approved all
of the costs that went into the house. At his deposition
Mr. Shupe stated that he was advised as to the rost
as the work progressed. He testified: " ... of course,
there was discussion about everything that went inli1
the place. No doubt there was discussion about it."
(205).
Exhibit 4, pp. 355 and 356 reflect Mr. Shupe's
detailed specifications furnished during the course of
construction with respect to the reinforcing steel in the
foundation. The expert witness called by the Shupes
admitted that whereas approximately 100 pounds of
steel are used in the foundation of an ordinary house.
he estimated that between 7,500 and 8,000 pounds were
used in the Shupe residence ( 364). Each piece of steel
had to be hand tied before the foundation was poured
( 365). He suggested that the amount of steel in this
structure would hold up "a pretty tall building." (366).
The record is replete with instances where the
Shupes revised plans and made changes and additions
to the structure as construction ensued. I t is· beyond
· these
the scope of this brief to attempt to 1't enuze
changes and additions in detail. Max Menlove, the
superintendent of construction, stated that there were
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least 100 changes ap.d additions ( 885). The Shupes
made no effort to controvert this testimony.

at

The record is undisputed that the men employed
by Menlove Construction Company who worked upon
the premises kept records with respect to their time
and were compensated on the same basis as they were
f'Ompensated in all other construction by the company.
There is not a shred of evidence that any men charged
auy time to the job which was not actually spent working on the job. There is no evidence that as much as a
stick cf lumber went into the house that was not called
for by the plans or the direct order of owners.
Some time during the end of the summer, after
:Nlr. and Mrs. Shupe had moved into a basement apartment in the house, they instructed Mr. Menlove that
they did not desire him to complete the work. Mr.
Menlove ,_·equested a payment on the account, reminding them that it had been substantially six months since
he had received any money (Ex. 9). When no payment
was n~ceived, Mr. Menlove filed a mechanic's lien on
November 5, 1963, pursuant to the provisions of Title
38, Chapter l of the Utah Code, in the amount of
~30,910.40 (Ex. 62). Notice of the claim was published in the Salt Lake Times in accordance with the
statute (Ex. 63).

W"hen the Shupes learned that Mr. Menlove had
filed a lien and intended to insist upon his rights under
the contract and under the lien statute, they filed the
complaint in this action alleging that Mrs. Shupe
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owned the property in question, that they had entered
into an agreement with the defendant, copy of which
was attached, and that they realized that they owed
Mr. Menlove some money but did not know how mucb
it was. They asked the court that defendant be required
to prove and show the amount which he claimed to
be due and to determine the amount of the indebtedness. The defendant filed a counterclaim in his First
Cause of Action that the plaintiff was indebted to
him in the amount of $30,910.45; that he had complied
with the requirements of 38-1-7 of the Utah Code, and
that he was entitled to a lien and the other remedies
provided under the statute. In a Second Cause of
Action, he prayed for judgment in the amount of his
costs plus 10%, pursuant to the provisions of the contract.
At the request of Mr. and Mrs. Shupe, Mr . .Menlove turned over to the Shupes' certified public accountant all of his invoices, records, checks and other
data concerning the costs incurred on the Yale Avenue
house ( 249, 250). These records were delivered some·
time in the fall of 1963 ( 255, 256). More than a year
later, on December 16, 1964, Mrs. Shupe answered a
written interrogatory by the defendant as follows:
"Q. Itemize in detail the expenses which plaintiff
claims were unnecessarily incurred by def~n~~;
as alleged in paragraph number 7 of plamt1 s
complaint.

"A. Plaintiff is unable at the present time to

IO

itemize in detail the expenses which were unnecessarily incurred by the defendant . . . " (27).
At the trial, the plaintiff took two positions: (I)
that there was an oral understanding to the effect that
the total cost of construction would not exceed $35,~00.00. and ( 2) that Menlove Construction Company
did not substantially perform its agreement; therefore
it was entitled to receive damages only on a quantum
meruit basis. (See plaintiff's trial memorandum, 46,
50).

The court determined at the conclusion of plainciff's evidence on defendant's motion, that there was
11:.i evidence to support plaintiffs first position.
The
trial judge determined that based upon the admissions
of Mr. Shupe on cross-examination, the plaintiff had
~onceded that there was no oral agreement placing a
limit upon the cost of construction ( 487, 488). Plaintiff has filed no protective motions with respect to
sud1 ruling and it must be conceded on this appeal that
the trial judge's ruling on this point was correct. The
case was submitted to the jury upon special interrogatories submitted by the plaintiff (126, 7). In its answer
tn the first interrogatory, the jury determined that
Menlove Construction Company had substantially
perfoiwed its obligations under the contract. The
factual determination upon this question, therefore,
is adverse to the plaintiff's position, and since Mrs.
Shupe has made no effort to obtain a new trial, or to
otherwise complain of the jury's verdict, it must be
11

conceded on this appeal that such finding is binding
upon her.
The jury determined, notwithstandmg the undisputed evidence with respes_t to the actual costs of
Menlove Construction Company, that the costs incurred
in the construction of the structure was $43,000.00
( 133) . It determined further than an offset should
be allowed to plaintiff because of defective construction
and delay in the sum of $1230 (ibid).
Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwith·
standing the verdict to the effect that the defendant's
cost plus lOJ'o was in the sum of $49,461.56, or in the
alternative, $49,061.56, on the ground that the verdict
as returned by the jury was contrary to the evidence
and the weight of the evidence, and that the jury
failed to follow the court's instructions with respect
to the applicable interrogatory, and that the evidence
conclusively established said amount to be defendant's
costs of construction and that there was no evidence
to the contrary. The defendant further moved that
the court fix a reasonable amount to be awarded to
the defendant as attorney's fees pursuant to the pro·
visions of 38-1-18 U.C.A., and that judgment be en·
tered in favor of the defendant on both of his causes
of action in the sum of $30,910.45 plus interest, costs
and such reasonable attorney's fees (134). The trial
judge denied the motions. Defendant then moved for
a new trial solely on the question of damages, upon
the grounds, among others, that the verdict of the jury
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was against the weight of the evidence and that inadequate damages were given under the influence of passion or prejudice ( 140). The defendant's position on
the motion for new trial was substantially that a great
part of the evidence in the case was directed to the
question of recovery on a quantum meruit basis and
that such evidence was wholly inadmissible and irrelernnt in determining defendant's cost plus 10'/o. The
jury's finding with respect to damages necessarily reflected the fact that it had considered evidence in the
Cll.se which was introduced by plaintiff in support of
her claim on quantum meruit in determining the question as to d~f endant's actual costs of construction plus
lO(/~. Defendant argued that in view of the fact that
the <iury had determined that the defendant substantially performed his contract and defendant was prepar<:d to concede an offset in the amount represented
by the jury's findings, to-wit: $1230., defendant should
be awarded a new trial solely upon the question of
damages.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ENTER A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WITH RESPECT TO
THE ANS,VER TO 'VRITTEN INTERROGATORY 2-B IN THE SUM OF $49,461.56, OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE THE AMOUNT OF
$49,061.56.

'
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The law is clear that where an owner has agreed
to compensate a contractor for construction on a cost
plus basis, that the contractor is entitled to recover
his actual costs plus the designated fee or percentage
of costs, whichever formula is applicable. Shafer et al.
v. Lee, (1917) 64 Okla. 106, 166 P. 94, and see 10 II
Am. J ur. 15, Building and Construction Contracts '
Sec. 20, and 17A C.J.S. 367 (2) for general discussion I
of cost plus contracts.
:
!

I

'

There is no dispute in the instant case at this
juncture of the proceeding that Menlove Construction
Company is entitled to be compensated for its costs
plus 10% based upon the agreement of November 2,
1962 between the parties (Ex. l) . The crux of the
problem is whether the trier of facts should be per·
mitted to stubbornly ignore and refuse to be guided ,
by competent, credible and uncontradicted evidence
with respect to the Appellant's costs. This case must
be distinguished from Arnold Machinery Co. v. lntru· '
sionPrepakt,Inc., (1960) 11 Ut.(2d) 246,237P. (2d)
496. In that case plaintiff had leased to defendant a
compressor unit to be used on a construction job. The
compressor burned out because of lack of lubrication
and overheating. The burning out was due to an oh·
structed oil line caused by a brass cutting. There was
evidence that the plaintiff had included in his state·
ment "numerous and substantial charges for other ex·
penses connected with the repair of the machinery, ,
· g of
such as travel, telephone costs, freight and towm .
equipment back and forth". This court held that if

1
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the jury was bound to accept plaintiff's evidence at face
value and render a verdict exactly in accordance with
1ts claims, the defendant might, in some instances, be
"quite at plaintiff's mercy". The court pointed out that
the repairs made on the machine "lay solely within the
plaintiff's knowledge".
In the instant case, the actual construction costs
were controlled by the Shupes. It is undisputed that
the Shupes waited until the house was nearly completed and until the contractor obligated himself to
his own laborers, materialmen, suppliers and subcontractors before they even notified him that they had
any complaints. After requiring Mr. Menlove to
extend himself in giving his own credit to subcontractors and actually paying most of them, the finder of
fact should not be in the position of putting him at
the Shupes' mercy. Mr. Shupe admitted that "there
was discussion about everything that went into the
place". The costs were incurred under his active direction. The entire conduct of the Shupes is inconsistent
with any good faith claim that they seriously contested
any of the costs which Menlove Construction Company actually incurred in the construction of this house.

In fact, until the present time, the Appellant has
never been advised as to what specific items of cost
are being disallowed. The Shupes and their certified
public accountant had access to all of the defendant's
records between the fall of 1963 and at least the middle
of November, 1964. The trial was held in early March,
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1965. In the year and a half that the Shupes and their
counsel and accountant had access to these records
they were unable to suggest even one item which should
not properly be charged as a cost of construction.
The first four billings were paid. Certainly the
Shupes cannot be heard to object that the hourly rate
of the employees of Menlove Construction Company
was objectionable because these rates were itemized
in the statements, and the amounts represented by
costs based on such rates were a pp roved and paid.
Shupes cannot suggest that any amounts paid for
subcontractors were excessive or did not represent
actual costs of construction. The record shows that the
Shupes actually approved each subcontract, either as
to the actual amount of the bid or the method of billing
or the precise portion of the construction involved. ~o
particular purpose is served by reference to the eridence with respect to each of these subcontracts. The
Appellant has never been advised and does not now
know what subcontracts, if any, are objectionable insofar as the Shupes were concerned or insofar as the
findings of the jury of the lower court reflect any
possible dissatisfaction with any particular item. In
this respect, the Appellant is fighting a shadow. H~
actual costs of construction, as clearly reflected by his
records and the proof of payment to his employees
and to suppliers and subcontractors, is nearly $6,500
more than he was awarded by the jury. The defendant
has no way of knowing what subcontractors should
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not be paid. Should l\Ir. Menlove refuse to pay Amherst Cabinet & Mill, who is now threatening a lawsuit

against him for the total amount of the cabinets which
were actually selected by Shupes and installed at their
request! Should he withhold payment from the painter
who worked under the direct supervision of Mr. and
}Irs. Shupe and their decorator? Should he attempt
to recoup payment by the brickmasons who were selected
by the Shupes and who approved the brick and the
amount of brick bid? The evidence shows that the
Shupes actually consulted with Barnes Electrical per~onnel and accepted their suggestions with respect to
the type of furnaces to be installed in the house and
the fixtures that were to be used. Can this court say
that l\lr. Menlove is obligated to pay Barnes Electric
for these items and that the Shupes are not liable to
him for them?
The inequity of the lower court's determinations
is reflected by paragraph 9 of the judgment {139).
Judge Anderson determined that Mr. Menlove was
obligated to pay all of the laborers, materialmen and
subcontractors in the amounts reflected in the invoices,
Exhibits .5 through 12. This amount, without allowance
of a single dime to l\Ir. Menlove for his overhead or
profit, would be approximately $45,000. Yet the amount
awarded to Mr. Menlove before any deduction reflected
by the offset, would be only $43,000. (Compare paragraph 9 of the decree, 139, with the jury's answer to
Interrogatory No. 1, 133).
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It appeared at the trial that the Appellant was
a co-owner of Apex Lumber Company. Apex was
organized as a cooperative. I ts billing arrangements
with .Mr. l\ilenlove was on the basis of its cost pllli
10%. Five percent of said 10% was represented br
the actual expense of doing business of Apex Lumbe;,
and the other 5% was represented by a contribution
to capital. The plaintiff's own expert testified that the
cost of materials in the house was reasonable and competitive and was not excessive ( 357, 361) . Obviously.
therefore, since Apex Lumber supplied the materia~
of the total invoice value of $7,489.89, the cost of such
materials cannot be said to be unreasonable or excessive. Leaning over backwards, however, the Appellant
stated in open court at the trial that if the 5% charged
by Apex as contribution to capital was not deemed
to be a cost within the contemplation of the parties.
he would consent to a reduction of his claim m the
amount of 5% of the total Apex bill. Thus on his
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, be
suggested alternatively that the total cost of construe·
tion be reduced $400 from the $49,461.56 represented
by the billings.

Appellant suggests that the result achieved in
this case, if the determinations of the trial court stand,
is that Mr. and Mrs. Shupe enjoyed the benefits of
a house which was actually paid for by .Mr. Menlove
in the sum of more than $6,000.
It is submitted that Arnold Machinery Co., supra,
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doe 5 not support this result. The case of American
Smleillf.<J. v. Zee (1951) 120 Ut. 402, 2:-35 P (2d) 361,
is more applicable to the present case than Arnold Machincr,IJ Cu., supra. In American Scale 1llfg. case,
the ('(lurt q uote<l with approval the following:
"'Vhere the testimony of a witness is uncontradicted and not inherently improbable, and
there are no circumstances tending to raise a
doubt of its truth, the facts so proven should be
taken as conclusively established and verdict on
decision entered accordingly."
It is certainly conceivable that there are situations
where a contractor claims reimbursement for costs that
11ere not actually incurred. It is certainly conceivable
that aE owner may have offsets against a contractor
as :i result of negligence or construction delays or
!lung' of that kind. In the instant case, the jury found
that an offset existed against .Mr. l\lenlove in the sum
1 f ,i;,1:230.00, and while the Appellant does not believe
th~t this amount is justified in view of the failure of
the Slmpes · evidence to distinguish between purported
negligence in construction and the items which were
unfinished because Shupes prevented the completion
oi the project, the Appellant does not quarrel with
the $1230 figure.
-

Appellant suggests, however, that the law does
not and should not sanction the conduct of the Shupes
m the instant case. The Shupes determined the contractor's costs; they selected the plan of construction;
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they were responsible for certain increased expenses
by reason of the inad~quacies of the original plan and
changes in the plans made during construction; the\
selected the materials and all the materials they selected
were the most expensive that were available. They knew
the actual costs of construction as the various phases
were decided upon and completed. Then when the job
was done, after they had moved into the house, and
after they knew that the defendant had obligated himself to pay contractors and laborers and materialmen
for the building which they had chosen, they decided
to attempt to impale defendant upon his own laxness
in failing to insist upon payment as work progressed
during construction.
Appellant suggests that the jury's determination
is totally arbitrary. Appellant does not suggest that the
jury was "obliged to follow abjectively the [defend·
ant's] evidence". (cf. Arnold Machinery at 497 Pacific
Reporter). But the jury is required to follow some
evidence. If there were specific individual items of
cost which the defendant should not be awarded, or
which were not incurred, or as to which there was a
dispute in the evidence, the jury might well have re·
duced from the contractor's claim such items which
were the subject of such evidence or dispute. But the
Shupes presented no such specific evidence. There were
no specific items ever placed in dispute. If such items
were placed in dispute it is impossible to come to a
rational conclusion that the jury resolved the dispute
in favor of Shupes. The jury could not find from the
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eridence that Mr. Menlov:e's costs just happened to
be the round figure of $43,000. Appellant suggests
that the finders of fact in the instant case simply imposed an unreasoning imposition of their will upon
the defendant and that such conduct "is the essence
of tyranny and the antithesis of justice". (Arnold,
supra, at 479 Pac.) .
The case was presented to the jury on the theory
that if the defendant substantially performed the obligations described under the contract, he was entitled
to recover his costs plus 10%, less any offsets or credits
which the jury determined were to be allowed the
plamtiff. There was no actual issue with respect to
plaintiff's costs plus 10%. The posture of the parties
and the position of the court was made clear from the
conduct reflected in the record in connection with the
ruling on defendant's motions and the instructions
given to the jury.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, for instance, defendant asked the court to determine that
as a matter of law there was no competent evidence
from which the jury could find that the defendant had
not substantially performed his contract and that the
defendant therefore should be awarded judgment in
the amount represented by his invoices, or in the alternative, the amount of the invoices less 5% of the Apex
Lumber billing. The court indicated in ruling on the
motion that he was submitting the question of substantial performance to the jury. The court stated
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explicitly, however, "If the jury should determine that
there was substantial performance, why then there
would be only the question of offset." ( 489). In the
court's Instruction No. 10 the jury was advised that
Menlove Construction Company had the burden to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it substautially complied with the terms of the contract. If that
burden was satisfied, then the plaintiff had the bnrden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff is entitled to some offsets or credits again~!
the cost of construction plus 10% thereof which Menlove Construction Company is entitled to receive under
the terms of its agreement ( 103). Substantial perform·
ance was described in Instruction No. 19:
"A building contractor is entitled to recover
under the terms of his contract only if he has
substantially performed his part of the bargain.
In this case the defendant's performance has
been put in issue, and the burden of proof is
upon the defendant to establish that he did per·
form substantially as agreed, or that he was
prevented from doing so by plaintiff. To estab·
lish substantial performance, the defendant must
prove, by a preponderance of the evid.ence that
he (I) exercised reasonable skill and JU~grnent
in letting subcontracts, in performing his own
work, and in supervising his workmen a~d ~uh·
contractors; ( 2) performed the construct10n ma
reasonable time; ( 3) rendered statements read
sonably; and ( 4) exerted his best efforts towar
constructing the Shupe residence at the most
reasonable cost possible." ( ll2).
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Again in Instruction No. 20, the jury was advised
that if it determined that defendant construction company had substantially performed the written contract,
that it was entitled to receive its costs of labor and
materials plus 10%.
"On the other hand, if the defendant fails to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
he substantially performed the written contract
between the parties, then the defendant contractor is not entitled to recover the cost of labor
and material plus 10% agreed to but may recover
only the reasonable cost of the materials and
labor which have been incorporated into the
home, and without allowance for the IO fee%
of the contractor." (113).

It is, of course, true that the defendant had the
burden of proving the amount of his costs. But in the
instant case. the defendant's invoices were actually
introduced by the plaintiff ( 172) . Plaintiff actually
proved defendant's costs herself. She proved defendant's method of recording invoices and time costs and
she proved that the same kind of records, including
time records, were kept on the Shupe job as on other
construction projects of the defendant (289). It is
hornbook law that a party is bound by its own evidence.
32 CJS p. 1104, Evidence, Section 1040. The same
rule applies where the evidence is adduced from an
~dverse witness, particularly unless such testimony
Is contradicted by credible evidence (ibid, p. 1107,
et seq. Sec. 1040 (b).
Thus plaintiff effectively has conceded the amount of the cost plus 10%.
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The parties and the court all proceeded on the assumption that if the contractor substantially performed,
as the jury found he did, his damages were liquidated
No evidence was introduced to show or to tend to
show that the costs reflected by these invoices were net
actually incurred. On the contrary, the evidenre
adduced by .Mrs. Shupe was all directed toward the
point that defendant had not reasonably performed the
contract and that he was entitled to recover only on
a quantum meruit theory. The trial court conceded
on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict that
"If the jury should determine that there was substan·
tial performance, why then there would be only the
question of offset" ( 489).
Inasmuch as the jury found without equivocation
that Menlove Construction Company substantiall)·
performed the obligations described under the contract.
the trial court should have granted defendant's motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the total
amount of defendant's costs plus his 10/1c. Appellant
admits, for the purpose of argument on this appeal.
that the jury's finding of allowing plaintiff an offset
in the amount of $1230 is supportable from the evi·
dence and that such amount should be deducted from
the net judgment awarded against the plaintiff.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN·
STRUCTIONS NUMBER 3 AND 4.
24
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Defendant requested that the court give instructions number 3 and 4 as follows:
"Instruction No. 3
The defendant in this action, Roy A. Menlove,
entered into a written contract with the plaintiff,
Ruth 1V. Shupe, on the 2nd day of November,
1962, which has been received in evidence in this
case as Exhibit 1. This agreement was in the
nature of a cost plus contract. The parties agreed
that the defendant was to receive for his services
as a general contractor in building the house in
question in this litigation all of his costs plus a
fee of 10% of the cost of construction. Your sole
duty and prerogative as jurors in this lawsuit is
to determine the total cost of construction of the
house and to add 10% of such cost, such total
being the amount which the defendant is entitled
to recover on each of his causes of action."
"Instruction No. 4
You are instructed that there is nothing illegal
or improper about a cost plus contract. If the
owners of the premises agree to pay a contractor
his entire costs of constructing a house plus a
percentage of such costs for the contractor's
services, the contractor is entitled to recover all
of such costs plus the percent agreed upon. In
the case before vou: the evidence is uncontradicted that the defendant's costs are in the sum
of$ ________________ , The agreement between the parties
provided that the defendant was entitled to recover these costs plus an additional 10% thereof
for his services."
(Defendant offered to fill the blank in Instruction
No. 4, but since the court indicated that he would refuse
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the instruction, the blank was not completed at the
time.)
The jury determined that the defendant ~ub~ta 1
tially performed the contract. Appellant submits, thert·
fore, that Instruction No. 3 is a correct statement uf
the law with respect to the subject matter involre 11
and that the instruction should have been given. Cer·
tainly with respect to interrogatory 3 the jury should
have been instructed directly and succinctly that their
sole prerogative was to determine the total cost of con·
struction and to add 10% to such costs. The jury
should have been instructed in substance and effect
that they should not be permitted to speculate as t<i
what the cost might have been by some other persou
in building the house. In view of the fact that eridm.t
was received in the case on a quantum meruit theory.
the giving of this instruction in the instant case was of
particular significance.
Appellant submits that Instruction No. 4 cor·
rectly and succinctly states the law applicable to the
posture of the parties in the instant case. Appellant
suggests that the Respondent will not even argue upon
appeal that the contractor is not entitled to recow
costs plus 10% in the instant litigation. The defendant
was entitled to a precautionary instruction that there
is nothing illegal or improper about a cost plus con·
tract and the jurors should have been aware of the
legal proposition that when an owner agrees to pay
a contractor for the costs plus a designated percentage
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that the owner is bound to make such payment. The
contractor certainly cannot be led down a primrose
path into believing that he will be compensated for
the items actually selected by the owner and then be
required to pay for them himself. The advantages in
cost plus contracts are to be weighed against the disadvantages at the time the contract is made, not after
a house is constructed. In view of the fact that there
has been some popular discredit of cost plus contracts,
particularly in government projects in this area, the
failure of the court to give the instruction in the instant
case constituted prejudicial error.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ADMIT INTO EYIDENCE DEFENDANT'S
PROPOSED EXHIBIT NUMBER 67.
The plaintiff introduced evidence on her theory
of the case with respect to the quantum meruit theory
of recovery. Her expert witness was substantially
impeached upon cross examination but the testimony
he gave could easily have the effect of diverting the
jury's attention from the real issue in the case, namely,
the cost of construction incurred by Mr. Menlove.
To assist the jury in understanding the actual
costs of construction as they related to the different
phases of the building operation, defendant offered
Exhibit 67. It is filed with this brief as Appendix A
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( 866, 867). This exhibit is an analysis of all of .:lli
Menlove's costs applied to all of the rnrious phasts

of construction. It was prepared by Max :\Ienlor"
the superintendent on the job, in conjunction with ]i 1,
study of the invoices and time records in existence and
his knowledge of what phases of construction were
completed during the times reflected in the origin:il
records. This exhibit makes more understandable the
actual invoices because it relates the labor and material
costs in the invoices to the particular phases of con·
struction described in the exihbit.
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the exhibit on th"
ground that it was hearsay and that it would give undue
emphasis to the testimony of the witness on the q_uestinn
of damages ( 867). Appellant submits that the ob Jee·
tion is invalid under the circumstances of this cn>e.
Section 78-25-12(5) U.C.A. provides that an exception
exists to the parole evidence rule:
" . . . when the original costs of numeruu1
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time. anJ
the evidence sought from them is only the general
result of the whole."
Exhibit 67 arranges the information contained in Ex·
hibits 5 through 12 in an orderly fashion so that i'
could have been understood by the jury. It is submitted
that the trial court's error in refusing to receiYe the
exhibit was particularly prejudicial in the instant case.
inasmuch as the jury determined that Mr. :Menlore
substantially performed his obligations. The sole and
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critical remaining question was simply the cost of construction. The jury should have been afforded an opportuff.ty to have a compilation of the numerous invoices,
tune sheets and other data contained in Exhibits 5
through 12 for use in its deliberations. Prejudice is
particularly apparent from the result in the instant
l':tSe, since it is clear that the jury did not and could
not have arrived at its figure of damages from rational
considerations or objective examination of the evidence
itself.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
.\WARD DEFENDANT REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Section 38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated provides
that in any action brought to enforce a lien under Chapter l of Title 38, the Mechanics' Lien chapter, "the suceessful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in this action." In the instant case defendant's counterclaim was brought under the statute.
The counterclaim was anticipated by the complaint;
in fact, the complaint was only a procedural device
to be first in court. Plaintiff knew full well she was
indebted to defendant; she didn't know, so she said,
how much she owed. Plaintiff had never offered to
pay more than $35,200 prior to the bringing of the
action. She had not, in fact, actually tendered any sum
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in~o court and she steadfastly maintained during the
trial that she was not bound by the written agreemen•,
she signed with the defendant.

The trial judge refused to award attorney's fee>
on the theory that the contractor was not totalk sue·
cessful in that the jury's answer to Interrogato;y 2·B
was approximately $6500 less than the amounts r~·
ceived by his invoices and costs. It is submitted that
even if this court should determine that the jury's
verdict can stand, Mr. Menlove was the successful
party to the extent of substantially $8,000.00.
The ruling of the trial court would mean that in
any case where a contractor attempted to enforce a
lien under the statute, if he should be awarded less than
the amount he claimed, he would not recover an attor·
ney's fee. Appellant suggests that such result is nut
in accordance with the spirit or intention of the statute.
The result does not conform with the risks undertaken
by the parties when the agreement was executed. The
interpretation of the act by the trial court substantialh
thwarts the intention of the Legislature in that it
denies a contractor a reasonable attorney's fee where
he is required to litigate the lien. Such an interpretation
places a premium upon refusing to pay the amounts
owed to contractors, materialmen, laborers and others
for whose benefit the Mechanic's Lien statute was de·
signed. In the instant case, the very ambivolence ~nd
.
. 'ff' s cIaim
. reqmred
uncertamty
of the nature of p1amt1
far greater effort in the preparation of the trial than

30

would have been necessary if the plaintiff had even
~~much as indicated what particular costs she objected
h The reasons for the allowance of a fee are particularly cogent.
POINT V.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
.-\..ND THEREFORE ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT TO DEFENDANT A NR\V TRIAL
SOLELY ON THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES.
Appellant has established in Points I, II and III
of this brief that the trial court committed error. Appellant was, therefore, entitled on the grounds argued
in prior portions of the brief, to a new trial pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 59. The new trial should be
granted only to the issue of damages since Mrs. Shupe
is foreclosed on the two substantial points involved in
her presentation of evidence in the instant case, to-wit,
her contention that there was an agreed limit on the
amount of costs plus the applicable percentage, and
that 1\Ir. Menlove did not substantially perform the
obligations under the contract.
Aside, however, from the errors suggested in the
first three points of the brief, Mr. Menlove should be
awarded a new trial upon the ground that the amount
of the jury's verdict was inadequate. In United Press
Associations v. National Newspapers Association ( CCA
8
: 1918) 254 F. 284, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a
situation where the substantive rights had been deter-
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mined in prior proceedings. The jury had returned~ a.
verdict which ignored the instructions of the court and
awarded damages in a nominal amount; whereas tlie
evidence showed that the plaintiff was entitled to receive substantial damages. The trial court had faiierl
to grant a motion for a new trial. The Circuit hel<l
that the failure to grant a new trial was reversible
error.
"~t is our opinion that the trial judge, being
an mtegral part of the court, charged with !ht
duty and responsibility of seeing that iustice
was administered between the parties, ~hould
have granted a new trial, and that his failure to
do so was an abuse of his discretion."

In the United Press Associations case the court
referred to the fact that there was certain evidence
from which the jury may have been confused witl1
respect to the amount of damages due. In that ca~'.
the vice president of plaintiff had sent a telegram before
the suit was instituted expressing his view that damages
would be only in the sum of $500. The court held that
such telegram was not binding upon the plaintiff a!ld
could not be used to reduce the sum of damages actuall)·
proved to said amount.
In the instant case there was evidence from whicli
the jury could have been substantially confused with
respect to the damages recoverable under the cost plus
agreement. Counsel for l\frs. Shupe elicited informa·
tion from one of the witnesses from which it appeared
that certain materialmen and subcontractors had not
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been paid by Mr. Menlove. The amount due to these
subcontractors was approximately $6,500.00. {257).
Perhaps it is no accident that the jury's verdict was
c1pproximately $6500 less than the total amount retiected bv the invoices (Ex. 5-12 inclusive) . Appellant
submits, moreover, that the testimony of Carl Ohran
could have led the jury into error in the matter of
determining the contractor's cost plus 103. Mr. Ohran
was called as an expert witness by Mrs. Shupe for the
purpose of making an estimate of the reasonable cost
of construction of the house. Such evidence was totally
irrelevant to the question of the costs of Menlove Construction Company. It did not take into account the
numerous and repeated changes made by the Shupes
during the course of construction, nor was the witness
able to state what portion of the figure he allocated for
labor upon the various labor costs that went into the
building. However, his testimony was before the jury at
+he time they were considering damages. As in the
r·nited Press Associations case, this kind of evidence
might easily have confused the jury on the precise issue
they were called upon to determine.
In Boden v. Suhrmann (1958) 8 Ut. (2d) 42, 327
P. (2d) 826, the majority of this court held that where
"the verdict is outside the limits of what appears justificable under the evidence, to the extent that it should
not be permitted to stand ... the remedy is a modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence;
~nd the adverse party is given the choice of accepting
It or taking a new trial." The majority's opinion in
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example number 2 described a situation where a de
fendant was liable and there was no dispute as tr
the amount of the damages. The court indicated thai
in such event, the court should order the verdict iii
creased to the correct amount or permit a new trial.
Appellant recognizes that there was a vigorolli
dissenting opinion in the Boden case, but Appellant
suggests that the relief which the Appellant seeks 111
the instant action is within the rationale of both the
majority, the concurring opinion, and the dissenting
op1mons.

In the case at bar, the liability of the owner of thr
home under the cost plus contract was positively estah·
lished by the jury's answer to Interrogatory Xo. 1. As
stated in Point I of the brief, the case was tried upon 1;1e
theory that if the contractor's performance substantially
satisfied the contract he was entitled to the full amo11n 1
of his claim less any off sets which the owner established
Such offset was found by the jury and is not disputed
here. Appellant suggests that the inconsistency betwee11
the amount awarded to the Appellant as his costs plus
103 and the jury's response to Interrogatory Xo. 1
indicates that the jury was confused or misled upon
the question of damages or that its verdict indicates
passion or prejudice, and that the trial court should.
· · of
have granted a new trial pursuant to the prons10ns
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. cf. 89
Am. Jur. p. 155, New Trial Section 148 and authorities
cited.
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SCMl\IARY AND CONCLUSION
This is a case where the jury fairly and properly
determined the substantive rights of the parties but
brc:ame confused and misled upon the appropriate measure of recovery. Since the case was tried upon the basic
theory that if the jury found that the defendant contractor substantially performed his obligations he would
be entitled to the amount of costs which he claimed, plus
a percentage thereon, and inasmuch as there was no
objection to any single item of cost, the trial court should
ha,·e corrected the jury's verdict and awarded an amount
in accordance with the contractor's claim on the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Failing this, the court should have granted a new
~rial on the sole issue of damages so that the issues
couid have been tried in an atmosphere free from the"
obfuscating evidence involved in a determination of
the substantive questions.
In any event, the defendant is entitled to an award
ot' LJttorney·s fees under Section 38-1-18 of the Utah
l' 0 de. Appellant submits that even if this court should
decide that it is unable to determine from the record
the defendant's actual costs of construction, defendant
should be awarded a new trial where the attention of the
Jurr could be focused solely upon what would then be
the only relevant issue.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2~ti,

day of November, 1965.

GEORGE M. McMILLAN and
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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Exl1ibit D

07

J\PPENDIX A

CONSTHUCTION COST BREAKDO,'VN

A. Clearin.q and Ea'cavation of Lot:
I ...Menlove

~
'-]

Constr. (Cat., clearing lot, loading soil, breaking &
loading old foundation & grading)
2. Trucks (hauling trees, soil, found.)
3. Rulon Denney (breaking found. & ftg.)
4. Menlove Const. (labor & supervision 2500 yards moved)

Cash cost
951.60
954.60
236.00
295.11
2,437.34

B. Drain Around and Under House:
I. Menlove Constr. (labor & suprvn)

2. Int. Pipe & Ceramics (drain pipe)
3. Utah Sand & Gravel (drain gravel)
4. Menlove Constr. (hauling gravel & excavated soil)
5. Menlove Constr. (hauling gravel)

855.00
133.76
166.63
228.00
52.00
1,435.39

C. Subcontractors and Material Suppliers On Job:
I. Heatrite Eng. (hood kit fan)
2. Terrazo Rods (front entry)

~

61.40

3. Flowers Plumbing (sewer & water line installation)
4. Salt Lake Mill (oak treads for stairway)
5. Oscar Chytraus Co. (garage door)
6. Formatop (kit. cabinet tops)
7. Otto Buehner (fireplace hearth)
8. Const. Spec. Co. (skylight)
9. Morrison Merrill Co. (carport beam)
10. Heatrite Eng. Co. (GI flashings & sill covers)
11. Builders .l\Iill (mill & farbicate redwood beams, labor only)
12. Rulon Denney (break out old ftgs.)

13. Frontier Oil & Sanzo Coal (hay & oil to protect concrete &
thaw ground)
14. S & R Found. Spraying (waterproofing)
15. Menlove Const. Co.
'} G.

Cat. costs)
1\t1eI-i.love

c~.nllst.

(final exc. of found., backfill & grueling

12.95
337.00

186.85
131.02

268.00
97.75
26.0()

125 ..1'4<
45.54
216.:30
10.50
5.4:3
{i.5.00
Al30.00

( d·u.rnp

t"t:t1ek~

hal.•l

in1-~

soi]:.-

]1._un ber

&.

trash)

17. Gibbons

&

Reed

&

l'iccl-E-Mix

found., flatwork)
18. D. B . .Mitchell ( plwnher)

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.
33.
34.

(total concreet

mtls,

ftg.,

Barnes Heating
Barnes Electric (no lighting fixtures included)
Fuller TrinH"iew (glass, windows & sliding doors)
Durafloor (floor coyerings)
Menlove Constr. (labor to lay floor tile basmt. apt.)
Elias-Morris Co. (ceramic tile)
Amherst Cabinet Co. (2 kitchens & linen closet)
Fred Bleazard ( sheetrock, double laminated)
"\Vestern Steel (angle irons)
"\Vestern Steel ( ftg. & found. reinf arcing steel)
Clark Roofing
Martin Thompson & 2 employees (painting, labor only)
Menlove Constr. (labor flat concrete)
Menlove Const. (labor circular stairway)
Menlove Constr. (labor to place, cut, handle & tie reinforcing
steel in found.)
Menlove Const. (labor to build, pour, & strip, ftgs & found.)

2,1n9.2a

2,275.00

1,918.00
1,123.00
1,158.91
784.22
125.20
588.00
1,225.70
2,066.5-1<
51.3:2
738.61
480.00
1,695.00
1,292.51
89.00

669.56
936.00

35. l\fenlove Constr. (labor to do brg. partitions, floor system,

roof system, interior & exterior partitions)

3,506.18

balcony, work bench & concrete window wells)

1,505.00

36. Menlove Constr. (labor for carport, cornice, window frames,
37. Menlove Const. (labor for front entry, window trim, railing,

interior finish, paneling & hardware)
38. Apex Lumber (all lumber, finish mtl., trim, doors, hardware
& paint)
39. Menlove Const. (Cat. cost to hoist concrete into found. & help
move concrete trucks)
40. Jos. Curtis & Sons (brickwork)

o
"""

D. Retaining Wall, Hand Esc. and Hauling to Rear of House:
1. Menlove Const. (labor & supervision)
2. United Rent-All (post hole digger)
3. Pole Line Supply Co. (wall anchors)
4. Apex Lbr. (rerlwood wall mtl.)
5. Menlove Const. (Cat. exc. & hauling)
6. Menlove Const. (truck hauling soil)
TOT AL CASH COST
10';7r overhead & profit
..-£"( _. ......

~

T

~

.--.TTI•:

1,558.()3
7,489.89
18..t.o:i
0.ono.00

950.00
4.80
89.12

408.82
98.00
30.00

1,!')80. 7 4

44. !)()fj .llH

'

4. l<fHL_,..O

~) -

..

';.

... - ·". ;

